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Historical Bafflement of the Chinese People 
June 6, 2009 in A Year of Anniversaries by The China Beat | No comments 
David Kelly, researcher at the University of Technology Sydney, translated the following opinion piece 
by overseas political commentator Liang Jing. He has published several previous pieces at China 
Digital Times, including, “Trigger for an Earthquake in Chinese Society” and “Where Does Wen Jiabao’s 
Faith Come From?” 
One of the most significant cultural phenomena in Chinese society in recent years is the growing 
interest in history. Everyone—elite and general populace, leftists and rightists—shows an 
unprecedented enthusiasm for understanding China’s past. And in 2009 a series of major 
historical anniversaries, including the 90th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, have 
pushed China’s “historical fever” to new highs. One of the major reasons stimulating the keen 
interest in history is that the “reforms” that followed June Fourth, returned China to a “pre-
liberation” scenario almost overnight: bureaucratic corruption, moral bankruptcy, social 
injustice; to the point that, in some important aspects, such as higher education, the status quo in 
China is not as good as the KMT era, and many phenomena that people thought could not 
happen again, such as prostitution and the sale of official posts, not only occur, they do so on a 
far greater scale than in the past. 
History has played a big joke on the Chinese, who having experienced countless sufferings and paid 
the price in countless lives, rather than gaining social progress with their bloody struggle, have turned 
full circle to find themselves back where they started. How exactly did this come about? Not only the 
elite, but also many ordinary people are puzzled by this problem. This historical puzzlement of 
unprecedented numbers of people is what drives China’s historically unprecedented “public history 
movement.” 
The heroes emerging from this enlightenment are a group of intellectuals who have consciously and 
unconsciously enhanced the public’s knowledge of history. The role they play in promoting China’s 
social progress may far exceed that of the elite in control of the current political discourse. Two figures 
who, in my opinion, well represent these “modern heroes”, are Yi Zhongtian, and Shi Yue, who 
wroteThings Ming under the pen name Dangnian Mingyue [Moonlight Back Then]. One thing these two 
writers of very different age and experience have in common is use of modern mass media, to tell 
ordinary people, honestly and wittily, the true logic of the Chinese history in layman’s language. They 
not only subvert the “proper history” as repeatedly distorted by China officialdom, but also upgrade 
the “unofficial history” of China to new levels, because their telling of Chinese history is imbricated 
with the spirit and values of modern civilisation. 
The old tales retold by Yi Zhongtian and Shi Yue, are clearly a cultural rebellion not only against the 
official historiography and its materials, but against the CPC’s political message as well. Because they 
tell people—the younger generation in particular—there are no differences in human terms between 
the emperors of thousands of years ago and the big shots in the political arena today; no political 
figures, therefore, should be mystified or treated as sacred. The CPC rulers understand the political 
implication of this cultural rebellion, of course, hence do not allow the likes of Yi Zhongtian to extend 
their historical fascination to the CPC’s history. As relations between the KMT and the CPC ease, 
however, more restricted areas of history are being broken, and as the fruits of research of the 
network of overseas Chinese continue to break the CPC blockade, a new generation of intellectuals in 
the PRC can see more and more of the whole picture of China’s modern history. 
Even so, optimism about the Chinese people waking up from their historical bafflement, and avoiding 
being led into another great disaster is hardly called for. The level of materials and artifacts of the 
China of 90 years ago cannot be compared to today’s, of course; but the degree of political tolerance 
of those in power, the morale and ideological independence of academia, the energetic spirit of young 
people in China of that day, were incomparable greater than now. Had they seen the deference and 
obedience of faculty and students “dancing attendance” upon Hu Jintao when he came to Chinese 
Agriculture University on May 3, the students and scholars who took part in the May Fourth Movement 
would have given it a thumbs down. 
The paradox of history is that the historical responsibility for China’s subsequent big disasters 
lies precisely with the movers and shakers of the May Fourth Movement 90 years ago. So, today, 
many of China’s intellectual elite hold severely critical attitudes towards May Fourth cultural 
radicalism, arguing that cultural conservatism should be the guideline for China’s future 
development. 
I accept that cultural radicalism takes some of the blame for the disasters of the last century, but fail 
to understand the actual proposals of cultural conservatism. Will cultural conservatism be able to 
succeed where cultural radicalism has failed? Such simplistic thinking is disturbing. Connected to 
China’s present realities, the regime controls unprecedented resources, and has formed a huge 
bureaucratic class who are incapable of providing basic social security to the majority of the 
population. Officials in Guizhou prostituting young girls [1], profiteers in Ningxia suborning judges in a 
joint fraud [2]—appalling scandals like these show that the regime is losing its governing capacity. 
What does it actually mean to call for cultural conservatism it such times? Won’t a day come when the 
Chinese people, once again falling into historical bafflement, find that when making a stand is called 
for, no one is there to make it? 
* Liang Jing, “Zhongguoren de lishi kunhuo” [Historical bafflement of the Chinese people], 5 May 2009 
[梁京：“中国人的历史困惑”， 2009年5月 5日.] 
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